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United States v. Scott.' Should a Pre-Trial
Releasee Be Subject To Fourth Amendment
Searches and Seizures Based on Probable
Cause or Reasonable Suspicion?
Gina M. Muccio*
Introduction
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the United States District
Court for the District of Nevada's suppression of a shotgun and
statements made by defendant, Raymond Lee Scott (Scott), as a
violation of Scott's Fourth Amendment rights.2 The court held
that the government may not conduct a search of an individual
released while awaiting trial, based on less than probable cause
even when his Fourth Amendment rights were waived as a con-
dition of pre-trial release.3 The main issue evaluated by the
court was whether the government can induce a defendant re-
leased on his own recognizance and awaiting trial, to waive his
Fourth Amendment rights and subject him to anything less
than probable cause concerning searches and seizures. 4 The
court decided this question in the negative.5
This issue was one of first impression in the federal circuit
courts and in the majority of the state courts. The majority de-
cision was two to one.6 The Fourth Amendment grants individ-
uals the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures by the government. 7 Federal and state cases generally
1. United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2005).
* J.D. Candidate 2008, Pace University School of Law. The author is ex-
tremely grateful to her family, especially Joe, Joey and Brittani, for their constant
support and encouragement. The author is also grateful for the assistance of the
Pace Law Review, in particular the editing staff and Rick Wright for his time and
effort on early drafts. Additionally, the author would like to thank IBM Corpora-
tion for this challenging opportunity.
2. Id. at 875.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 865 n.4.
5. Id. at 875.
6. Id. at 875.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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address the waiver of Fourth Amendment rights as they relate
to probationers and post trial sentencing releasees. The major-
ity views pre-trial releasees as "presumed innocent" with rights
similar to ordinary citizens and very different from those indi-
viduals convicted of crimes, who are consequently subject to a
probable cause standard.8 The Dissent believes, however, the
pre-trial releasee does not enjoy the same rights as an ordinary
citizen, but instead enjoys rights similar to probationers and
pre-sentencing releasees.9  The Dissent asserts pre-trial
releasees are charged with a crime, and are therefore, not ordi-
nary citizens. The conditions placed on their release are in lieu
of being detained and held in jail. Therefore, according to the
Dissent they should be subject to the reasonable suspicion stan-
dard, rather than the probable cause standard.10
This case note will examine (1) whether pre-trial releasees
should be afforded more rights than the probationer, pre-sen-
tencing releasee and parolee; (2) whether pre-trial releasees
should be subject to searches and seizures based on probable
cause or reasonable suspicion; (3) whether the government
should be able to induce the waiver of the pre-trial releasee's
Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of his release; and (4)
the potential effects Scott will have on state pre-trial release
procedures. Part I will document the background information
concerning the current state of the law as it pertains to pre-trial
releasees, probationers and pre-sentencing releasees. Part II
will discuss Scott, including the facts, holding, majority opinion,
and dissenting opinion. Part III will discuss the impact Scott
has on the current state of the law, the potential of Scott for
appeal and how the Supreme Court may analyze and conclude
on the issues presented. Part IV will conclude on the impor-
tance of Scott on today's law.
I. Background Information
The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
8. Scott, 450 F.3d at 871-72.
9. Id. at 876-81 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 875-89.
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shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.1'
The fundamental rights of the Fourth Amendment are ex-
pressly granted in the Constitution and therefore require proba-
ble cause to search individuals and their homes. Alleged
violations of fundamental rights are scrutinized greatly by the
courts. Individuals may waive their Fourth Amendment
rights.12 However, the federal cases, generally dealing with the
waiver of Fourth Amendment rights, pertain to probationers
and post trial sentencing releasees. Federal courts have held
that probationers are subject to a standard of reasonable suspi-
cion regarding searches and seizures, rather than a standard of
probable cause. 13
The United States employs a rule "granting broad discre-
tion where pre-trial releasees are concerned."' 4 The applicable
federal statute pertains to the pre-trial release process, provid-
ing for pre-trial release subject to "any other condition that is
reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the person as
required and to assure the safety of any other person and the
community."15 Nevada's legislature has left release conditions
to be determined in individual cases.' 6
Current case law generally deals with persons convicted of
crimes. One federal case, United States v. Kills Enemy, con-
trasted an individual on pre-trial release with a convicted per-
son awaiting sentencing; the court stated, "[The latter] is no
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. Scott, 450 F.3d at 865 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
228 (1973)). In Schneckloth, the police had reason to stop the defendant for traffic
violations but no probable cause to search the vehicle or the occupants; however
the defendant voluntarily consented to the search. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218. The
Court stated, "[wie hold only that when the subject of a search is not in custody
and the State attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in
fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied."
Id. at 248.).
13. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).
14. Scott, 450 F.3d at 888 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (citing 18 U.S.C
§ 3142(c)(1)(B)(xiv) (2000)).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(xiv) (2000).
16. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 178.484-.4853 (2005).
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longer entitled to a presumption of innocence or presumptively
entitled to his freedom." 17 In Cruz v. Kauai, the court stated,
"[o]ne . .. released on pre-trial bail does not lose his or her
Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable seizures."'
8
The leading federal case concerning probationers and pre-
sentencing releasees is United States v. Knights.'9 In Knights, a
reasonable suspicion search of a probationer was upheld on the
theory of totality of the circumstances. 20 The Supreme Court
stressed the status of the individual as a probationer, with
sharply reduced liberty and privacy interests. 21 "Probation, like
incarceration, is 'a form of criminal sanction imposed by a court
upon an offender after verdict, finding, or plea of guilty.'
22
"Knights' signature on a form purporting to authorize searches
without a warrant or 'reasonable cause' as a condition of proba-
tion, reduced his reasonable expectation of privacy."23 "Proba-
tioner 'is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the
law."' 24 There is a difference between those convicted of crimes
and those accused of crimes, but still presumed innocent. Pro-
bationers are different from pre-trial releasees, in that they
have a reduced liberty interest from ordinary citizens and war-
rantless searches have been upheld.25 The current state of the
law concerning probationers is reasonable suspicion. 26 In
Knights, the Court held that the state's "interest in appre-
hending violators of the criminal law, thereby protecting poten-
tial victims of criminal enterprise, may therefore justifiably
focus on probationers in a way that it does not on the ordinary
citizen."27 Case law supports distinguishing probationers from
17. United States v. Kills Enemy, 3 F.3d 1201, 1203 (8th Cir. 1993).
18. Cruz v. Kauai County, 279 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002).
19. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
20. Id. at 121-22.
21. Id. at 119.
22. Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987)).
23. United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 873 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing United
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. at 114, 119-20 (2001)).
24. Id. (citing Knights, 534 U.S. at 120).
25. See Unites States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1988) (en
banc); United States v. Richardson, 849 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2002) (upholding warrantless searches).
26. Knights, 534 U.S. at 122.
27. Id. at 121.
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ordinary citizens; however, the status of the federal law con-
cerning pre-trial releasees prior to Scott is non-existent.
II. Statement of the Case
A. The Facts
The police arrested Scott for state drug possession crimes.28
Scott was released on his own recognizance. 29 As a condition of
his pre-trial release, Scott consented to random drug testing
and having his home searched without a warrant at any time by
any peace officer.30 After Scott's release, the police received in-
formation from an informant.31 The police went to Scott's home
and administered a urine test.32 The government conceded that
the information received from the informant was not enough for
probable cause. 33 The police then searched Scott's house and
found an unregistered shotgun. 34 The police then administered
two additional urine tests. Scott insisted that he did not take
illegal drugs and that he only consumed allergy medicine. 35 The
first two urine tests administered using the enzyme multiplied
immunoassay techniques were positive. 36 The final test admin-
istered using the more accurate gas chromatography mass spec-
trometry method was negative.37
B. Procedural History
"A federal grand jury indicted Scott for unlawfully possess-
ing an unregistered shotgun."38 Scott moved to suppress the
shotgun and any statements he made to the officers concerning
it. 39 The United States District Court for the District of Nevada
granted Scott's motion on the grounds that the officers needed
28. Scott, 450 F.3d at 865.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 890.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 865.
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probable cause to search Scott's home without a warrant.40 The
federal government took an interlocutory appeal.
41
C. The Holding
The Ninth Circuit Federal Court in Nevada affirmed the
ruling of the district court granting Scott's motion to suppress
the shotgun and the statements. 42 The court held the totality of
the circumstances required probable cause in order to search
Scott or his home. 43 "Since the government concedes that there
was no probable cause to test Scott for drugs, Scott's drug test
violated the Fourth Amendment."44 "'Probable cause to search
Scott's house did not exist until the drug test came back posi-
tive."45 The search was therefore invalid and the shotgun and
statements were suppressed. 46
D. The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion focuses on two issues (1) whether the
drug test and the search of Scott's home were valid because he
consented to them as a condition of his release, thus waiving his
Fourth Amendment rights, and (2) whether the search of Scott
and his home was reasonable. The majority is concerned with
the government's ability to induce the waiver of Scott's Fourth
Amendment rights by forcing him to choose between freedom
and prison while awaiting trial. Scott's consent to any search
was only valid if the search was reasonable.47
1. Whether the drug test and the search of Scott's home
were valid because Scott consented and waived
his Fourth Amendment rights?
Although Fourth Amendment rights can be waived, the
question is whether the government can induce Scott to waive
his Fourth Amendment rights as a condition to pre-trial re-
40. Id.
41. Id. at 890.
42. Id. at 875.
43. Id. at 874.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 875.
47. Id. at 863.
[Vol. 27:339344
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol27/iss2/5
UNITED STATES v. SCOTT
lease.4 "The government may detain an arrestee 'to ensure his
presence at trial."' 49 The government "may impose .. .condi-
tions[,] such as reasonable bail[, before releasing" an arres-
tee. 50 Many pre-trial detainees willingly consent to conditions,
in order to be released, preferring to go home while awaiting
trial. Scott's options expanded when he agreed to waive his
Fourth Amendment rights.5 1
Although citizens can waive certain rights in exchange for a
valuable benefit such as to go home rather than stay in jail, con-
stitutional law may not permit it in all circumstances. 52 "The
'unconstitutional conditions' doctrine . . . limits the govern-
ment's ability to exact waivers of rights as a condition of bene-
fits, even when those benefits are fully discretionary."53 "Giving
the government free rein to grant conditional benefits creates
the risk that the government will abuse its power by attaching
strings strategically, striking lopsided deals and gradually erod-
ing constitutional protections." 54 "Where a constitutional right
'functions to preserve spheres of autonomy. . . unconstitutional
conditions doctrine protects that [sphere] by preventing govern-
mental end-runs around the barriers to direct commands.' ' 55
Releasing Scott was a discretionary decision. "[Tihe Gov-
ernment's proposed conditions of release or detention [must] not
be 'excessive' in light of the perceived evil" under the Excessive
Bail Clause.56 In some cases risk of flight may be so low that
any amount of bail may be excessive and releasing one on their
own recognizance may be deemed a low flight risk, therefore
limiting the pre-trial release conditions. 57 The state must make
decisions on whom to detain and who to release, since it would
be impossible and impractical to jail every person charged with
48. Id. at 865.
49. Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979)).
50. Id. (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987)).
51. Id. at 865-66.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 866 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994)).
54. Id.
55. Id. (quoting Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102
HARv. L. REV. 1413, 1492 (1989)).
56. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987).
57. Scott, 450 F.3d at 867.
2007] 345
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a crime. The state may only impose conditions that are consti-
tutional once deciding to release someone. 58
The Fourth Amendment modern interpretation "depends
on whether a reasonable expectation of privacy has been vio-
lated."59 The Supreme Court decision in Katz expanded Fourth
Amendment protection from government invasions of privacy in
public places to include protection in private places such as
homes.60 "[A] Fourth Amendment search does not occur - even
when the explicitly protected location of a house is concerned-
unless 'the individual manifested a subjective expectation of
privacy in the object of the challenged search,' and 'society [is]
willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable."' 61 Impos-
ing warrantless searches as a condition of pre-trial release can
diminish the expectation of privacy. However, government em-
ployees do not waive their Fourth Amendment rights when ac-
cepting employment and any searches of government employees
must still be reasonable.62 The government, when acting as em-
ployer or sovereign, is subject to the same constraints. Deciding
whether someone will be jailed or released prior to a determina-
tion of guilt is a sovereign prerogative. 63 "'One who has been
released on pre-trial bail does not lose his or her Fourth Amend-
ment right to be free of unreasonable seizures .. . ."'64 Proba-
tioners who are subject to more restrictions than pre-trial
releasees do not waive their Fourth Amendment rights as condi-
tions of their probation. 65 "[A]ny search made pursuant to the
condition included in the terms of probation must necessarily
meet the Fourth Amendment's standard of reasonableness. 66
58. Id.
59. Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 867 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2001)).
62. Id. at 868.
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting Cruz v. Kauai County, 279 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002)).
65. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 261 (9th Cir. 1975) (en
banc).
66. Id. at 262.
346 [Vol. 27:339
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2. Whether the search of Scott and his home was
reasonable?
Scott's consent to any search is only valid if the search was
reasonable. The majority analyzed the reasonableness of the
government's search of Scott and his home. 67 Under the Fourth
Amendment, "reasonableness means that a search or seizure
must be supported by probable cause."68 However in U.S. Su-
preme Court cases Terry v. Ohio69 and United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce,70 pat-downs and minor intrusions can be sup-
ported by reasonable suspicion.
The requirements of probable cause can be relaxed "when
'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,"'
make an insistence on the otherwise applicable level of suspi-
cion "impractical. ' 71 Special needs can justify less than proba-
ble cause. 72 In Scott, "[t]he United States argues ... searching
pre-trial releasees by testing ... for drugs served two special
needs: (1) protecting the community from criminal defendants
released pending trial and (2) ensuring that the defendants
show up at trial."73 The court in Scott reasoned that the first
special need argued by the Government did not require any-
thing more than normal law enforcement. The second argu-
ment may require more than normal law enforcement,74
however two Supreme Court cases limited the special needs
doctrine, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond 75 and Ferguson v. City
of Charleston.76 In Edmond, the court invalidated a roadside
checkpoint program aimed at enforcing drug laws through drug
sniffing dogs and visual inspection of cars.77 "[Sluspicionless
checkpoint stops are constitutional only if their primary pur-
pose is separate from the general interest in crime control."78
67. Scott, 450 F.3d at 868.
68. Id.
69. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
70. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975).
71. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)).
72. Id.
73. Scott, 450 F.3d at 869.
74. Id.
75. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 39 (2000).
76. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
77. Scott, 450 F.3d at 869 (citing Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35).
78. Id. (citing Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41).
2007] 347
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The U.S. Supreme Court upheld programs designed to secure
the border 79 and programs that promote highway safety.80 Pro-
grams designed to deter or punish violations of ordinary crimi-
nal laws are not constitutional according to the U.S. Supreme
Court."'
In Ferguson, "the Court invalidated a state hospital's prac-
tice of testing pregnant women for cocaine and providing the
results to the police. The Court had upheld suspicionless drug
testing before, but in those cases, 'the special need' . . . was one
divorced from the State's general interest in law enforcement. '8 2
The government used law enforcement to coerce the patients
into substance abuse treatment. The Government's argument
was the beneficial goal of protecting mother and child; however
the Court said it was not distinguishable from general interest
in crime control.8 3
Edmond and Ferguson establish primary and ultimate pur-
poses for upholding special needs. The court examined the gov-
ernment's purposes for the search in Scott to see if any were
primary. The first special need argued by the government was
protecting the community from criminal activities of defendants
awaiting trial. The government's interest in preventing crime
by anyone is legitimate. Crime prevention is a general law en-
forcement purpose and the opposite of a special need.8 4 The sec-
ond government special need was ensuring that defendants
show up at trial. The government's special interest is the effi-
ciency and integrity of the judicial system.8 5 The question is
whether the interest in judicial efficiency is important enough
to override the individual's privacy interest under the normal
requirement of the Fourth Amendment's individualized suspi-
cion.8 6 The court must weigh the importance against the intru-
sion on the individual's interest in privacy. 87 The object of the
test is drug use and the harm to be avoided is non-appearance
79. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 (1976).
80. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990).
81. Scott, 450 F.3d at 869.
82. Id. (quoting Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79 (2001)).
83. Id. (quoting Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 80-81).
84. Id. at 870.
85. Id. (quoting State v. Ullring, 1999 ME 183, 13, 741 A.2d 1065, 1068).
86. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997).
87. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78.
348 [Vol. 27:339
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in court. The court concluded that there was not enough evi-
dence to show that pre-trial releasees show up to court in a drug
induced stupor or do not show up at all to support an intrusion
on the privacy rights of every defendant released and awaiting
trial. 88
The court concluded that this was a hypothetical result and
was highly unlikely. 9 "The Supreme Court has criticized asser-
tions of special needs based on 'hypothetical' hazards that are
unsupported by 'any indication of a concrete danger demanding
departure from the Fourth Amendment's main rule."' 90 The Ne-
vada legislature has not taken the position that drug use among
pre-trial releasees impairs their tendency to show up in court.
The legislature has left release conditions to be determined in
individual cases. 91 There is no obvious connection between drug
use and showing up in court. Therefore, the search condition
imposed in Scott was unnecessary to ensure Scott's appearance
at trial. 92
"Private residences are places which the individual nor-
mally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not au-
thorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that
society is prepared to recognize as justifiable."93 "The Fourth
Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of set-
tings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than
when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an
individual's home . . . ,,94 Pre-trial releasees are ordinary citi-
zens, accused of a crime but are presumed innocent in the eyes
of the law until proven otherwise. Scott's assent to his release
conditions does not make an unreasonable search reasonable.
His consent may have reduced his expectation of privacy, but
not enough to eliminate his expectation of privacy in his home.95
Although the Supreme Court in Griffin upheld the search of a
probationer's home without probable cause, Scott can be distin-
88. Scott, 450 F.3d at 870.
89. Id.
90. Id. (quoting Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319) (emphasis added).
91. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 178.484-.4853 (2005).
92. Scott, 450 F.3d at 871.
93. Id. (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984)).
94. Id. (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980)).
95. Id.
20071 349
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guished, since Scott is not a probationer. 96 Probationers have
been tried and convicted or have plead guilty. Pre-trial
releasees have not been tried by the court and there is no ver-
dict or admission of guilt.9 7 "Griffin is properly read as limited
by the fact that probationers have a lesser expectation of pri-
vacy than the public at large. ' 98 Pre-trial releasees have not
suffered any judicial abridgment of their constitutional rights.
There is no special needs showing and therefore, the police
needed probable cause to search Scott and his home.99
The search was not reasonable under a general "totality of
the circumstances" approach either.100 In United States v.
Knights, a reasonable suspicion search of a probationer was up-
held on the theory of totality of the circumstances. 101 The Su-
preme Court stressed the status as a probationer with sharply
reduced liberty and privacy interests. 10 2 Scott's privacy expec-
tations were far greater than that of a probationer. Scott was
not convicted of a crime; he was presumed innocent. Scott was
released on his own recognizance and his crime was not serious
enough to detain him, therefore, probable cause was needed to
search his person and home. The government conceded there
was no probable cause. Therefore, the search of Scott and his
home was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment. 103
E. The Dissenting Opinion
The Dissent is disappointed that the Majority adopted a
rule that carries monumental implications for pre-trial proce-
dures, employed by every state in the circuit, as well as the
United States, with a case of first impression in federal court
when no state is a party.10 4 The Dissent examines the status of
probationers, parolees, pre-sentence and pre-trial releasees
under state and federal common law. The Dissent argues that
probable cause was not needed to search Scott's person for
96. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 870 (1987).
97. Scott, 450 F.3d at 872 (citing Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874).
98. Id. (quoting Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S 67, 80 n.15 (2001)).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
102. Id. at 119.
103. Scott, 450 F.3d at 874-75.
104. Id. at 875 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
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drugs, once the test was positive there was probable cause to
search Scott's home. 10 5 According to the Dissent in Scott, the
standard for a warrantless search of a pre-trial releasee is the
same as the standard for probationers and parolees. All have
reduced liberty interests from ordinary citizens. 0 6 The Dissent
cites cases where warrantless searches were upheld. In these
cases, the defendants were convicted of crimes, free on bond or
pending sentencing. They had a diminished expectation of pri-
vacy from ordinary citizens and therefore probable cause was
not necessary. 0 7
The Dissent discusses the reasonable grounds standard,
discussed in State v. Fisher.0 8
A convicted felon who awaits sentencing is still subject to the
court's jurisdiction, but yet does not possess the same constitu-
tional rights as one merely accused .... Accordingly, [the defen-
dant's] rights must be analyzed not from the status of an accused
person, but from her status as a convicted felon released on per-
sonal recognizance and awaiting sentencing. 10 9
However, those awaiting trial and detained in prison have the
same privacy rights as those in prison already convicted of
crimes. 110
The leading state case imposing warrantless searches on
pre-trial releasees is In re York."' The defendants were unable
to post bail for their crimes. The California court offered pre-
trial release conditions, including random drug testing and war-
rantless searches in exchange for being released on their own
recognizance. The California Supreme Court upheld the pre-
trial release conditions on the grounds that the conditions were
reasonable within the guidelines of the California statute. 112
Pre-trial releasees do not enjoy the same reasonable expectation
105. Id.
106. Id. at 877 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
107. Id. (citing United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Richardson, 849 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1988); Unites States v. Con-
suelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1988)).
108. Id. (citing State v. Fisher, 35 P.3d 366 (Wash. 2001)).
109. Id. (quoting Fisher, 35 P.3d at 375-76).
110. Id. at 878 (Bybee, J., dissenting) ("treating pretrial detainees the same as
prisoners convicted of an offense") (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)).
111. In re York, 892 P.2d 804 (Cal. 1995).
112. Scott, 450 F.3d at 878 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (citing, In re York, 892 P.2d
at 806 ).
2007]
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of privacy as ordinary citizens who have not been charged with
a crime and defendants able to post reasonable bail. The ac-
cused is not required to agree to the conditions of pre-trial re-
lease and is only burdened by the conditions after consent. 113
One who cannot post bail is not entitled to the unconditional
bail release, but must consent to pre-trial conditions to receive
release. The conditions must be reasonable under the circum-
stances. The court must consider the relationship of the condi-
tion to the crime, defendant's background, prior criminal
conduct and totality of the circumstances. 114 The York case, dis-
tinguishes the pre-trial releasee from the ordinary citizen, in
that the ordinary citizen has not been charged with a crime, and
therefore the pre-trial releasee does not enjoy the same rights
as the ordinary citizen. The York case allows pre-trial releasees
to consent to conditions in order to be released awaiting trial
provided that those conditions are reasonable. 11 5 The majority
in Scott, held that pre-trial releasees cannot consent to condi-
tions of searches that are not subject to the same standard as an
ordinary citizen, probable cause. 116 Thus, York, is contradicted
by the Scott holding.
In balancing the Fourth Amendment with the pre-trial
releasee conditions the federal courts must look to state law and
may consider state precedent. 117 Nevada may impose reasona-
ble conditions on pre-trial releasees to protect health, safety
and welfare of the community to ensure the accused will appear
in court." 8 Nevada applies a reasonable suspicion standard to
probationary searches. 1 9 Although there is no case law to sup-
port applying the reasonable suspicion standard to pre-trial
releasees, the Dissent believes it is likely in the future.120 There
is a legitimate interest of the state to protect the public. "Ne-
vada's concern for the safety of the public is not 'general law
enforcement' when it is manifested in pre-trial conditions tai-
113. Id. (citing In re York, 892 P.2d at 806 ).
114. Id. (citing In re York, 892 P.2d at 814-15).
115. In re York, 892 P.2d 804 (Cal. 1995).
116. Scott, 450 F.3d at 874-75 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (citing United States v. Ooley, 116 F.3d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1997)).
118. NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.484(8) (2005).
119. Allan v. State, 746 P.2d 138 (Nev. 1987).
120. Scott, 450 F.3d at 882 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
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lored to this defendant."121 The accused enjoys the presumption
of innocence as a trial right, not as an ordinary citizen right.122
"The presumption of innocence is a doctrine that allocates the
burden of proof in criminal trials ... [blut it has no application
to a determination of the rights of a pre-trial detainee during
confinement before his trial has even begun."1 23 "Individuals on
pre-trial release may be treated differently than ordinary citi-
zens without violating the presumption of innocence.' ' 24
The court must weigh the state's interests against the ac-
cused's interests. The state's interest in supervising individuals
on pre-trial release, securing attendance at trial, and drug test-
ing ensures the accused is physically and mentally fit for trial.
Ensuring the accused is physically and mentally fit for trial pre-
serves judicial resources from delays and ensures that the ac-
cused understands the proceedings and participates in the
defense. 125 Scott's interest of privacy in his own home is pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment. There has been no criminal
judgment or sanction. Scott's rights are greater than a proba-
tioner, parolee or pre-sentencing releasee, but less than an ordi-
nary citizen. His expectation of privacy is diminished by his
consent.1 26
Pre-trial releasees suffer great burdens and are scarcely
free citizens at liberty. 27 In Albright v. Oliver, the defendant
was required to appear in court at the state's command and
seek formal permission from the court on travel. 128 The Dissent
asserts that a defendant who cannot post bail or receive release
on his own recognizance suffers greater deprivation of liberty. 129
If he has to remain in jail, it may imperil his job, interrupt his
source of income and impair his family relationships. 30 It can
even limit his access to his attorney and potential witnesses.' 3 '
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 883 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
533 (1979)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 883-84 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 885 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
127. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 279 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 278.
129. Scott, 450 F.3d at 885-86 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 885 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975)).
131. Id. at 885-86 (citing Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951)).
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There can even be a loss of reputation. 132 The question is
whether inducement is reasonable. Scott may give up one free-
dom for another. Consent to warrantless searches for freedom
to go home. Scott, in essence, is inducing the government to
waive bail if he waives his Fourth Amendment rights.133 The
Dissent believes the Majority strikes down Nevada's pre-trial
process of allowing detainees to consent to pre-trial release con-
ditions in order to sleep in their own beds at night. 34
The Dissent concludes that "pre-trial releasees are subject
to a balancing test that weighs the legitimate interests of the
state against the individual privacy interests at stake in light of
the unique circumstances and facts alleged."'135 The search and
seizure was valid and only reasonable suspicion was required to
administer the drug test and once the test was administered,
the police had probable cause to arrest Scott and search his
home.136
III. Impact of Scott and the Potential for Appeal
A. Scott and the Law Prior to the Scott Decision
Scott affords pre-trial releasees more rights than the proba-
tioner, presentencing releasee, and parolee. Prior to the deci-
sion in Scott, there were two leading cases decided by the
Supreme Court, Ferguson, decided in 2001 and Edmond, de-
cided in 2000, which the majority relied on. Neither case con-
cerned the rights of a pre-trial releasee. The defendants in
Ferguson were women arrested for drug use while in a hospital
seeking obstetrical care 37 and the defendants in Edmond were
individuals stopped at a vehicle checkpoint to interdict unlaw-
ful drugs. 38 In both cases the Supreme Court determined the
programs violated the Fourth Amendment rights of the
defendants.
In Ferguson, the issue presented to the Court was
132. Id. at 886 (quoting United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1414 (9th
Cir. 1985) (Boochever, J., concurring and dissenting in part)).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 887-88 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 889 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
138. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
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whether a state hospital's performance of a diagnostic test to ob-
tain evidence of a patient's criminal conduct for law enforcement
purposes is an unreasonable search if the patient has not con-
sented to the procedure. More narrowly, the question is whether
the interest in using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter
pregnant women from using cocaine can justify a departure from
the general rule that an official non-consensual search is uncon-
stitutional if not authorized by a valid warrant. 39
The issue is very similar to that in Scott, whether anything
less than probable cause is required to search an individual's
person or property. 140 The main difference in the facts is that
Scott was arrested prior to the search and the defendants in
Ferguson were arrested after the search. It can be argued that
the defendants in Ferguson were ordinary citizens and Scott
was not. The Supreme Court stated in Ferguson, "[w]hile re-
spondents are correct that drug abuse both was and is a serious
problem, 'the gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of
questions concerning what means law enforcement officers may
employ to pursue a given purpose." ' 141 The Court held, "[t]he
Fourth Amendment's general prohibition against non-consen-
sual, warrantless, and suspicionless searches necessarily ap-
plies to such a policy."142 Scott applies this principal of a mere
threat not being enough to substantiate warrantless, non-con-
sensual searches to pre-trial releasees, whether consent has
been given or not.
In Edmond, the Court considered "the constitutionality of a
highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose is the dis-
covery and interdiction of illegal narcotics." 43 The Court stated
that approved checkpoints generally involved individualized
suspicion. Furthermore, checkpoint programs, whose primary
purpose was to detect ordinary crime, had never been approved
by the Supreme Court. 44 The Court refused to uphold a check-
point "justified only by the generalized and ever-present possi-
bility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any
139. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 69-70.
140. Scott, 450 F.3d 863.
141. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 86 (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42).
142. Id. at 86.
143. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34.
144. Id. at 41.
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given motorist has committed some crime.' 1 45 The Court held
that the checkpoints violated the Fourth Amendment because
the primary purpose was general crime control. 146 The court in
Scott also struck down the primary purpose of protecting the
community against pre-trial releasee crimes as general crime
control. 147 Therefore, Scott places pre-trial releasees in the
same category as ordinary citizens not awaiting trial, but whose
Fourth Amendment rights were violated resulting in arrest.
The defendants in both Ferguson and Edmond were arrested as
a result of a search based on less than probable cause.
Scott requires pre-trial releasees to be subject to searches
and seizures based on probable cause.148 Probationers, who are
subject to more restrictions than pre-trial releasees, do not
waive their Fourth Amendment rights as conditions of their
probation. 149 "Any search made pursuant to the condition in-
cluded in the terms of probation must necessarily meet the
Fourth Amendment's standard of reasonableness."150 There-
fore, the government should not be able to induce the waiver of
the pre-trial releasee's Fourth Amendment rights as a condition
of his release.
The State of Wisconsin upheld the search of a probationer's
home without probable cause.' 5 ' In Griffin, the probation of-
ficer assigned to Griffin, a probationer, received a tip from a po-
lice officer that Griffin might have a gun in his apartment. The
probation officer searched the home of Griffin and found a
handgun. 152 Griffin was convicted of a firearms violation, which
was affirmed by both the Wisconsin Court of Appeals and Wis-
consin Supreme Court. 153 The Wisconsin Supreme Court "held
that the 'reasonable grounds' standard of Wisconsin's search
regulation satisfied . . .the Federal Constitution, . . ."154 The
Court also held that the search of the probationer's residence
145. Id. at 44.
146. Id. at 48.
147. United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir. 2006).
148. Id.
149. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 261 (9th Cir. 1975)
(en banc).
150. Id. at 262.
151. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 870 (1987).
152. Id. at 871.
153. Id. at 872.
154. Id.
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was "reasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
because it was conducted pursuant to a valid regulation gov-
erning probationers. 15 5 The Court reasoned that the special
needs of supervision over probationers justified searches with-
out a warrant and based on less than probable cause. The pro-
bationer did not enjoy absolute liberty, but only "conditional
liberty dependent on observance of special [probation] restric-
tions."156 Scott can be distinguished from Griffin, because Scott
was not a probationer. The court in Scott has distinguished pre-
trial releasees from probationers, in that the former is subject
to the probable cause standard and the latter is subject to a rea-
sonable suspicion standard.
Every state has a rule similar to Nevada granting state
judges broad discretion in the fashioning of pre-trial release
conditions. 157 California requires a "defendant's promise to
obey all reasonable conditions imposed by the court or magis-
trate" before he can be released on his own recognizance.158 Ari-
zona permits "trial courts to impose such reasonable conditions
on the person as it deems necessary to protect the health,
safety, and welfare of the community to ensure that the person
will appear at all times and places ordered by the court."159 The
decision in Scott may make state statutes obsolete concerning
pre-trial release conditions.
The potential effects of Scott on state pre-trial release pro-
cedures will inhibit the ability of states to condition pre-trial
releases. The states may decide to detain pre-trial releasees,
rather than release them on their own recognizance. The result
may very well be that pre-trial releasees will not actually enjoy
being released on their own recognizance, when states decide
not to offer such a choice.
155. Id. at 880.
156. Id. at 874 (quoting Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
157. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 178.484-.4853 (2005).
158. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1318(a)(2) (West 2006).
159. AIz. R. CRIM. P. 7.3(b)(4) (2006).
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B. The Aftermath of Scott
In December of 2005, the Federal Court for the District of
Oregon decided United States v. Skirving.160 The defendant,
Robert Skirving, was arrested. His pre-trial release was condi-
tioned on his submission to searches of his person, home or ve-
hicle as directed by the government's Pre-trial Services
department. 161 The police received anonymous information,
prompting concern over the possibility that Skirving would de-
stroy evidence on his home computer once his co-defendants
Brink and Ferguson were arrested. 162 Pre-trial Services was
contacted and Skirving's home computers were confiscated. 163
Skirving argued that probable cause did not exist to search his
home for the computers.164
Skirving notes that the veracity of the anonymous sources is un-
known, that the sources did not know the true names of the peo-
ple communicating with Brink over the internet, and that Brink
and Skirving did not want information saved to hard drives, mak-
ing the need to search the computers less obvious. 165
Skirving relied on Scott, 66 "which the government concedes
holds that warrantless searches of pre-trial releasees require a
showing of probable cause, despite any pre-release consent to
search given by the releasee as a condition of the release."' 167
The government argued probable cause existed, however the
Court was persuaded by Skirving's argument. 68
The Court in Skirving relied on Scott, holding, "I will not
allow the government to retain and use the copies of the com-
puter hard drives unless, under Scott, there is a showing of
probable cause. That issue will be decided in an evidentiary
hearing, if the government decides to pursue it."169 The Court
160. United States v. Skirving, No. 01-321-04-KI, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
38854 (D. Or. Dec. 14, 2005).
161. Id. at *1-*2.
162. Id. at *3.
163. Id.
164. Id. at *5.
165. Id. at *5-*6.
166. United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 888 (9th Cir. 2006).
167. Skirving, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38854, at *4.
168. Id. at *5-*9.
169. Id. at *9.
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then stated that if the government did not pursue the hearing,
the copies of the hard drives would be returned to Skirving. 170
The Skirving case is the first case to follow Scott. The fed-
eral courts will now scrutinize probable cause even when the
government argues that probable cause existed. In Scott the
government conceded that probable cause did not exist and only
a reasonable suspicion was required for pre-trial releasees, who
consent to searches as a condition of their release. 171 In Skirv-
ing the government argued that probable cause did exist when
the hard drives were confiscated.72 Therefore, the aftermath of
Scott, includes not only the ability of a pre-trial releasee to
waive his Fourth Amendment rights and consent to searches,
but also a stricter review of the validity of probable cause to
perform those searches, even though there was consent, as a
condition of release.
In an article recently published by the Harvard Law Re-
view, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Scott is criticized with
two significant limitations. 173 "Although the Ninth Circuit's de-
cision in Scott boldly sought to protect against the 'downward
ratchet of privacy rights," 74 two significant limitations in the
[CIourt's reasoning may open the way for future courts to signif-
icantly diminish the Fourth Amendment safeguards the court
sought to protect."175 The first limitation on the court's reason-
ing occurred when the court asserted that "Scott's 'consent to
any search is only valid if the search in question.., was reason-
able,' [the court] also reasoned that it should take 'consent into
account' in determining whether a search was 'reasonable."' 76
The Harvard Law Review case comment explains that
"[c]onsent that has not yet been determined 'valid' should play
no role in the 'reasonableness' analysis, given that such analy-
sis, under the Ninth Circuit's approach, is intended to deter-
170. Id.
171. Scott, 450 F.3d 863.
172. Skirving, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38854, at *4.
173. Case Comment, Criminal Law - Fourth Amendment - Ninth Circuit
Holds That Search of Pretrial Releasee Is Unconstitutional Despite Releasee's Con-
sent, United States v. Scott, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1630 (2006).
174. Id. at 1634 (quoting United States v. Scott, 424 F.3d 888, 892 (9th Cir.
2005)).
175. Id. at 1634.
176. Id. at 1634 (quoting Scott, 424 F.3d at 893).
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mine whether it was appropriate to extract the consent in the
first place. ' 177 Thus, the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit is
faulted for not determining whether the consent was first valid
before determining whether the search was reasonable. One
cannot give consent to a reasonable or unreasonable search, if
the consent was not considered valid in the first place.
The second limitation in the Ninth Circuit's reasoning is
that the Court undermined its assertion that induced, blanket
consent to searches should not, "by itself make an otherwise un-
reasonable search reasonable. '"17s The case comment explains
that when taking consent into account, there are three possible
conclusions: (1) the search is reasonable regardless of consent;
(2) the search would be unreasonable, however the consent fac-
tored into the reasonableness analysis, effectively makes the
search reasonable; and (3) the search is unreasonable with our
without consent. 79 Consent is immaterial in the first and third
conclusions because it does not play a role in determining the
reasonableness of the search.18 ° However, in the second conclu-
sion, the article explains that there is a direct conflict in the
Ninth Circuit's assertion in Scott that "induced blanket consent
should not have the effect of making reasonable an unreasona-
ble search conducted pursuant to such consent. The formal dif-
ference [in] the second category, [is that] the court has not
declared the search unreasonable before it concludes that the
consent makes it otherwise .... ,,181 According to the Harvard
Law case comment the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit threatens
its purpose in protecting privacy and liberty interests "by
preventing governmental end-runs around the barriers to direct
commands.' ' 8 2  The determination of reasonableness for
searches should be analyzed separately from the consent.
Whether Scott can consent to waive his Fourth Amendment
rights to be free of reasonable searches, depends on first deter-
mining whether the search was reasonable to begin with. If the
search was unreasonable, consent may no longer be an issue.
177. Id. at 1634-35 (citing Scott, 424 F.3d at 893).
178. Id. at 1636 (citing Scott, 424 F.3d at 896).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1637 (quoting Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions,
102 HARv. L. REV. 1413, 1492 (1989)).
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C. Potential of Scott for Appeal
The Scott case has the potential for appeal because there is
currently no federal standard for pre-trial releasees and very
few states have been presented with the issue. The Supreme
Court would probably review the case in order to establish a
standard for pre-trial releasees who waive their Fourth Amend-
ment rights in order to be free on their own recognizance while
awaiting trial. The Fourth Amendment rights are fundamental
rights explicitly granted in the Constitution of the United
States. The issue of whether a pre-trial releasee enjoys the
same rights as an ordinary citizen or a person on probation
needs to be certified by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
must decide whether the pre-trial releasee is an ordinary citi-
zen, in a class with probationers and those awaiting sentence,
or in a class all his own, distinguished from ordinary citizens,
probationers, or those released awaiting sentencing. Ordinary
citizens are subject to probable cause, while probationers are
subject to reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment
as interpreted by the cases discussed.
D. How the Supreme Court May Analyze Scott on Appeal
The Supreme Court may strictly scrutinize the govern-
ment's ability to persuade or induce a pre-trial releasee to waive
his Fourth Amendment rights, when reviewing Scott, on appeal
because these are fundamental rights granted by the Constitu-
tion. The Government will have to prove a compelling state in-
terest to condition pre-trial release on the waiver of one's
Fourth Amendment rights. In addition, the compelling interest
must be narrowly tailored to ensure the state's interest out-
weighs the fundamental rights of the pre-trial releasee to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 8 3
The Supreme Court may also use the equal protection
clause analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment when re-
viewing the Scott case. The government may be viewed as dis-
criminating between those individuals accused, but not
convicted of a crime and ordinary citizens. If you have been ac-
cused of a crime, the government is subjecting you to reasonable
suspicion: if you have not been accused of a crime, the police
183. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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must have probable cause to search you or your home. 84 The
Constitution does not distinguish between those accused and
those not accused where Fourth Amendment rights are con-
cerned. Therefore, if the government discriminates based on
pre-trial releasees and ordinary citizens, the conditions must
then be rationally related to the important interest of the
state. 85 If the interest of the state is to ensure the pre-trial
releasee shows up to court drug free and the means of accom-
plishing that are subjecting the pre-trial releasee to searches
and seizures without probable cause, the Supreme Court may
strike it down, without specific findings that pre-trial releasees
do not consistently show up for court or show up so impaired
that they cannot comprehend the proceedings.
The fundamental rights granted in the Constitution are the
essence of our nation and the Supreme Court will more than
likely look to preserve them. The government, if it chooses to
appeal must prove that the compelling government interest
substantially outweighs the fundamental right of an individual
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 8 6 There
must be a compelling reason that is narrowly tailored to the
government interest as to why a pre-trial releasee should be re-
quired to waive his Fourth Amendment rights in order to forego
imprisonment, while awaiting trial.
IV. Conclusion
Pre-trial Releasees are neither ordinary citizens nor con-
victed felons. There must be a balance between the expectation
of privacy intrusion and the legitimate interests of the state.
The pre-trial releasee should not have to forego one free-
dom, the right to an expectation of privacy, for another freedom,
the right to be released on his own recognizance pending trial.
The balancing approach discussed by the Dissent is consistent
with the analysis used by the Supreme Court in deciding funda-
mental rights cases. The Dissent proposes weighing the legiti-
mate interests of the state against the individual privacy
interests at stake in light of the unique circumstances and facts
184. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
185. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
186. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618.
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alleged. This would allow the judge to decide whether or not in
each individual case the state's interests are greater than the
privacy interests of the alleged criminal. Individual application
would allow the Court to chose which crimes pending trial are
serious enough to allow an individual to consent to searches and
seizures based on reasonable suspicion. However, the standard
would then become very subjective and it would be difficult to
predict which pre-trial releasees would be subject to probable
cause and which would be subject to reasonable searches.
The importance of the Scott case is that it created a stan-
dard of review for pre-trial releasees equivalent to ordinary citi-
zens. It reinforced that individuals are presumed innocent until
proven guilty. Although Fourth Amendment rights can be
waived, the standard for searching a pre-trial releasee's person
or home will remain probable cause, thus making the waiver
obsolete. Scott has simultaniously undermined the ability of
the states to condition pre-trial releases and to induce individu-
als to waive their Fourth Amendment rights. As a result, many
states may decide not to allow pre-trial releasees to be released
on their own recognizance, therefore creating a burden on both
those unable to post bail and the capacity of state penitentia-
ries. Many states may decide as a matter of public policy that
the overall community is best served by imprisoning all alleged
criminals pending trial. The burden on the state penitentiaries
may then be so great that trials may be delayed even longer,
restricting the freedom of those accused of crimes even more.
The pre-trial releasee will then be subject to an even greater
fundamental right, the right to his very own liberty. An indi-
vidual should have the opportunity to decide which right he
would rather forego, the right to liberty or the right to unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. The Scott case may very well,
revoke the individual's right to make that choice.
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